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What News on the Rialto?  
The Trade of Information and Early Modern Venice’s Centralised 
Intelligence Organisation 
ABSTRACT  This article explores one of the earliest centrally organised state 
intelligence services in world history. Contrary to the orthodoxy that sees 
systematised intelligence as a modern political phenomenon, this was 
developed in early modern Venice. The article reveals the complex 
organisation of Venetian systemised intelligence that distinguished it from 
other contemporaneous states’ espionage networks. It also shows how Venetian 
authorities commodified intelligence by engaging citizens and subjects in a 
trade of information for mutual benefits. Ultimately, the article challenges our 
understanding of early modern political communication and offers a fresh vista 
of intelligence as a business trait and economic necessity. 
As love and good intelligence bear the security of our possessions, so do rumours and 
disagreements jeopardise everything.1
Introduction 
Intelligence gathering and espionage have long fascinated the reader and, in more recent 
years, the historian. Official and unofficial narratives of clandestine operations, covert agents 
and intelligence agencies have competed for shelf-space in bookshops and libraries, to 
complement the ever-appealing genre of spy fiction. Indeed, historians have been scrutinising 
declassified records in their efforts to produce a robust history of the subject. This, however, 
spans largely from the eve of The Great War to the twenty first century,2 while more distant
eras remain unexplored. Scholars have recognised the implications of this dearth and some 
work has been done on early modern states like England (and later Britain),3 France,4 the
Dutch Republic,5 the Habsburg and Ottoman empires,6 Portugal,7 Spain,8 and the dominant
Italian states.9
1 The Council of Ten to the Proveditor of Corfu, Archivio di Stato di Venezia (Hereafter ASV), Consiglio dei 
Dieci (hereafter CX), Parti Secrete, Registro (hereafter Reg.) 11, carta (hereafter c.) 65 recto (hereafter r.) (10 
Nov. 1575). 
2 The bibliography on this topic is vast. For an overview see Philip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: 
Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century (London: Deutsch 1987); For Britain, see Christopher R. Moran, 
‘The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources, and Trajectories in the United Kingdom’, Studies in 
Intelligence 55/2 (2011), pp.33-55. 
3 Peter Fraser, The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State and their Monopoly of Licensed News (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1956); Alan Marshall, Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660–
1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994). 
4 Lucien Bély, Espions et Ambassadeurs au Temps de Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard 1990). 
5 Karl De Leeuw, ‘The Black Chamber in the Dutch Republic during the War of the Spanish Succession and its 
Aftermath, 1707–1715’, Historical Journal 42/1 (1999), pp.133-156. 
6 Emrah Safa Gürkan, Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secrecy, Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-
betweeners and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry, unpublished PhD thesis (Georgetown University, 2012). 
7 Fernando Cortés Cortés, Espionagem e Contra-Espionagem numa Guerra Peninsular 1640–1668 (Lisbon: 
Livros Horizonte 1990). 
8 Carlos J. Carnicer Garcia and Javier Marcos Rivas, Espias de Felippe II: Los Servicios Secretos del Imperio 
Español (Madrid: La esfera de los libros 2005); Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven: 
Yale University Press 1998). For an overview of the literature, see Christopher Storrs, ‘Intelligence and the 
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Despite these notable efforts, our understanding of pre-modern intelligence and espionage 
remains fairly limited and reliant on a few accounts of individual spies or spymasters,10
espionage networks and their covert operations,11 and cryptography.12 These scattered
scholarly outputs reveal the unsystematic exploration of the ways in which intelligence 
emerged and evolved in its trajectory towards the contemporary state-of-the-art intelligence 
services.13 Additionally, historians of intelligence have primarily focused their attention on
the political and military nature of espionage. The expansionist and economic drivers that 
greased the wheels of strategy formulation and policy making, however, have been 
overwhelmingly neglected, if not ousted from the study of pre-modern intelligence. In other 
words, the unsystematic historical exploration of intelligence has centred on the latter’s 
political character and implications, while the social and economic aspects of its evolution 
and systematisation remain unchartered territory. The absence of relevant sources is often 
held by historians as the reason for this.14 Yet, it is fascinating to know that already by the
end of the fifteenth century governments had started to formalise information management 
and knowledge control.15 This took form in the systematic organisation of record keeping and
archiving.16 Archival records, therefore, exist and await exploration in order to unravel the
gestation and systematisation of intelligence in the pre-modern era.  
While potential monographs on this subject merit consideration, this dearth has led to a 
misconception that sophisticated diplomacy, bureaucracy and state-organised security are 
characteristic of the modern state.17 As this article will contend, this orthodoxy is no longer
Formulation of Policy and Strategy in Early Modern Europe: The Spanish Monarchy in the Reign of Charles II 
(1665-1700)’, Intelligence and National Security 21/4 (2006), pp.493-519. 
9 On Venice, see Paolo Preto, I Servizi Segreti di Venezia: Spionaggio e Controspionaggio ai Tempi della 
Serenissima (Milan: Il Saggiatore 1994); on Venice and Genoa, see Romano Canosa, Alle Origini delle Polizie 
Politiche: Gli Inquisitori di Stato a Venezia e a Genova (Milano: Sugarco 1989); on Savoy, see Christopher 
Storrs, War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999); On 
Milan, see Francesco Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta”: Forme e Strutture della Diplomazia Sforzesca (Naples: 
Liguori 1998);  on the Italian states in general, see the essays in Daniela Frigo (ed.) Politics and Diplomacy in 
Early Modern Italy: The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2000). 
10 On England, see James Cooper, The Queen's Agent: Francis Walsingham at the Court of Elizabeth I (London: 
Faber and Faber 2011); Alan Haynes, Walsingham: Elizabethan Spymaster and Statesman (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire: Sutton 2004); On Spain, see Carnicer Garcia and Rivas, Espias de Felippe II; on France, see 
Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press 2009). 
11 Joseph Dedieu, Le Rôle Politique des Protestants Français 1685–1715 (Paris, Bloud & Gay 1920); Philip S. 
Lachs, The Diplomatic Corps Under Charles II and James II (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 
1965). 
12 David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, 2nd ed. (New York: Scribner’s 1996). 
13 One exception is Diego Navarro Bonilla’s analysis of 53 political, military and diplomatic treatises of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Diego Navarro Bonilla, “‘Secret Intelligences’ in European Military, 
Political and Diplomatic Theory: An Essential Factor in the Defense of the Modern State (Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries)”, Intelligence and National Security 27/2 (2012), pp.283-301. 
14 Daniel Szechi, ‘Introduction: The “Dangerous Trade” in Early Modern Europe’, in idem, The Dangerous 
Trade: Spies, Spymasters and the Making of Europe (Dundee: Dundee University Press 2010), pp.1-21, (pp.16-
17). 
15 See, for instance, Voncent Ilardi, Studies in Italian Renaissance Diplomatic History (London, Aldershot 
1995); Senatore, “Uno Mundo de Carta”. 
16 For Venice, see Filippo de Vivo, ‘Ordering the Archive in Early Modern Venice (1400-1650)’, Archival 
Science 10/3 (2010), pp.231-248; Armand Baschet, Les Archives de Venise (Paris, Henri Plon 1870). For Italy, 
in general, see Paul Marcus Dover, ‘Deciphering the Diplomatic Archives of Fifteenth-Century Italy, Archival 
Science 7/4 (2007), pp.297-316. For Spain, see José Luis Rodríguez de Diego, Instrucción Para el Gobierno del 
Archivo de Simancas (año 1588) (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura 1989). 
17 Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia: A History of Political Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988 (London: Unwin 
Hyman 1989); William O. Walker III, National Security and Core Values in American History (New York: 
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sustainable. Exploring records from the Archives of Venice, Simancas and London, this 
article will challenge this view, by revisiting one of the world’s earliest centrally organised 
state intelligence services. This took shape and form in the pre-modern world, in early 
modern Venice. There, the systematic, corporate-like organisation of bureaucracy, diplomacy 
and intelligence undergirded the city’s commercial and maritime supremacy.  
The article will start with a brief discussion of Venice’s emerging administrative and 
bureaucratic structures that saw not only the systematic organisation of information and 
official record-keeping, but the systemisation of diplomacy and, as a result, the sophistication 
of secret intelligence processes.18 It will proceed to discuss the different communication 
channels the Republic employed for its clandestine missions; the development and refinement 
of its state intelligence apparatus; and the significance of secrecy in rendering Venice one of 
the most supreme commercial and maritime empires in the early modern world. The article 
will particularly focus on the composite complexity, efficiency and corporate-like 
organisation of Venice’s intelligence apparatus that distinguished it from other 
contemporaneous states’ espionage networks. It will also show how the Republic used the 
commercial mind-set of even politically excluded Venetian commoners to render them 
dealers in information of political consequence. In doing so, it will reveal a hitherto unknown 
facet of politically excluded Venetians. Ultimately, the article will advance the value of 
broadening and deepening the historical study of intelligence beyond the modern era and past 
the realm of politics. 
 
Intelligence and Information Gathering in Early Modern Venice 
 
In May 1591 the Venetian merchant Antonio Tizzoni visited a Venetian public notary to 
make a formal declaration. The document in question, drafted and also signed by Tizzoni’s 
naval crew two years earlier in England, declared a severe incident. In 1589 Tizzoni’s galley 
was captured by English corsairs close to the Cape of St. Vincent in the Algarve. From there, 
it was transported to England, where the corsairs seized a precious trunk containing paintings 
of the Siege of Malta. The paintings belonged to the Portuguese Don Diego di Sosa, a 
member of the Order of the Knights of Malta, but the looters destined them for the High 
Admiral of England as a gift. Notably, the value or the intention of the cargo was not deemed 
worthy of mention in the official document.19  
A few decades earlier a woman named Laura Troilo was making her living by entertaining 
eminent men as a courtesan. Courtesanry was a more refined form of prostitution, one of 
early modern Venice’s thriving industries.20 Courtesans were highly educated and 
sophisticated female companions of men in power. Mannerly and cultured, they were distinct 
from ordinary prostitutes due to their education and eloquent use of language. They were 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cambridge University Press 2009); Richard C. Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Wiley 1994); Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster 
1994). 
18 On the systemisation of diplomacy, see Isabella Lazzarni, ‘Renaissance Diplomacy’, in A. Gamberini and I. 
Lazzarini (eds.), The Italian Renaissance State (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), pp.425-443; on the link 
between the history of communication and intelligence, see Larry Willmore, ‘Government Policies toward 
Information and Communication Technologies: A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Information Science 28/2 
(2002), pp.89-96. 
19 ASV, Notarile Atti, busta (hereafter b.) 11653, p. 229, Notary Marino Renio (14 May 1591). 
20 Some of the most notable studies on Venetian courtesans include: Antonio Berzaghi, Donne o Cortigiane? La 
Prostituzione a Venezia. Documenti di Costume dal XVI al XVIII Secolo (Verona: Bertani 1980); Rita 
Casagrande, Le cortigiane Veneziane del Cinquecento (Milan: Longanese 1968); Doretta Davanzo Poli and 
Irene Ariano (eds.), Il Gioco dell’Amore. Le Cortigiane di Venezia dal Trecento a Settecento (Milan: Berenice 
1990); Margaret Rosenthal, The Honest Courtesan: Veronica Franco, Citizen and Writer in Sixteenth-Century 
Venice (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1992). 
4 
 
renowned for both their sexual and intellectual capacities, and it was due to the latter that 
they were sought by reputable men and feared by the Venetian authorities.21 In that capacity – 
and in perfect fusing of the two oldest professions in the world – Laura Troilo entrapped and 
denounced a state official for revealing state secrets. Antonio Landi, the official in question, 
was serving as state secretary for the Senate. With his wife permanently in Padua, Landi 
frequented the residence of Troilo, where he met another one of her clients, Giovanni Battista 
Trevisan. Both men frequently engaged in political conversations, but to ensure secrecy, the 
conversations were held in Latin. Suspicious of this, Troilo informed a friend, Girolamo 
Amadi, who, hidden behind the bed, overheard the two plotting to communicate state secrets 
to the Duke of Mantua, a close friend of Trevisan’s and a bitter foe of Venice. The 
denouncers reported the pariahs to the authorities and were handsomely rewarded for doing 
business with them.22 
Both these reports are representative of ways in which information of political weight was 
communicated in early modern Venice.23 Upon reading them, one could contest their 
relevance to intelligence. After all, what do these have to do with covert operations? This 
seemingly simple observation encapsulates the fundamental issues associated with the study 
of pre-modern intelligence, that are, in fact, more complicated than a scholar of modern 
intelligence might envisage. Defining intelligence as a historical phenomenon is problematic. 
What constitutes intelligence throughout history? Is it a professional service or a civic duty? 
Is it a political act or an economic necessity? Actually, intelligence can be all of the above 
and because of its multi-valency, that is, its different manifestations in different 
circumstances, it means different things to different people.  
In early modern Venice the term ‘intelligence’ meant ‘communication’ or ‘understanding’. 
In this article, the term will be used to denote any kind of information of political, economic, 
social or cultural nature that was worthy of evaluation and meaningful decision of potential 
action by the government. In Venice this was made possible due to a variety of information 
gathering and communication channels: the political channel of the formally established 
governmental institutions like the Senate, the Collegio, and the Council of Ten; the 
commercial channel, made up of a maze of merchants’ letters and reports;24 and the personal 
channel, whereby individuals of all levels of society, eponymously or anonymously, collected 
and divulged information pertaining to state security. Although rumours and fabrications 
were unavoidable, the frantic existence of these composite communication channels enabled 
the systematic evaluation of information through the process of comparison.25 
 
Venice as an Information Centre 
 
To trace the origins of modern intelligence, one must inevitably cross paths with Venice, one 
of the most significant commercial and maritime empires in the early modern world. Between 
the fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century, Venice had dominated vast parts of northern Italy, 
                                                          
21 Elizabeth Horodowich, Language and Statecraft in Early Modern Venice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2008), p.177. 
22 Giuseppe Tassini, Alcune delle più Clamorose Condanne Capitali Eseguite a Venezia (Venice: Tipografia di 
G. Cecchini 1866), pp. 129-130; See also, Marino Sanudo, I Diarii, edited by Rinaldo Fulin, Federico Stefani, 
Nicolò Barozzi, Guglielmo Berchet, Marco Allegri (Venice: F. Visntini 1879-1903), vol. 1., pp.918-919. 
23 On the circulation of political information in Venice, see Filippo De Vivo, Information and Communication in 
Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007); Horodowich, Language and 
Statecraft. 
24 On the difficulties examining this body of documentation, see Richard Mackenney, ‘Letters form the Venetian 
Archive’, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 72/3(1999) pp.133-144.  
25 Gürkan, ‘Espionage’, pp.39-40. 
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the Balkan Peninsula and the islands of the Levant.26 Simultaneously, she had become the 
master of the most strategic Mediterranean and European trade routes, controlling the 
commerce of luxury items like silk and spices from India and Egypt. In Europe, she provided 
the main trade link between Germany and the Mediterranean.27 As a result, for early modern 
Venice commercial and territorial supremacy were blurringly intertwined. This commercial 
and territorial supremacy, combined with its strategic geographical position midway between 
the Ottoman and the Spanish empires, placed Venice at the forefront of diplomacy’s 
advancement and sophistication.28 It is due to this position that Venice became the central 
terrain of encounters between foreign representatives seeking information on behalf of 
several foreign powers.29  
This was not accidental. Alongside its commercial and maritime pre-eminence, St. Mark’s 
protégée gradually became the most significant agency of news in the nascent modern 
world.30 The fifteenth century saw the revolution of printing and publishing. Very quickly, 
early modern Europe became obsessed with news that arrived from all corners of the globe 
and made headlines on various vital affairs, like the menacing advancement of the Ottomans 
towards European lands; the naval expeditions to the New World; the developments of the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation; and, most importantly for Venice, the prices of spices 
and all the other advancements of a rapidly evolving economy.31 So, when Salanio opened 
the third Scene of The Merchant of Venice with the line ‘What News on the Rialto?’ his 
contemporary Venetians were well aware of the economic and political weight of this 
question. 
While news was becoming a commodity and a craze in Europe, for Venice it was more or 
less business as usual, a kind of ‘vernacular commerce’, as Richard Mackenney pertinently 
termed it.32  Already from medieval times, the Venetian government’s overall orientation 
towards the protection of trade had led to the development of a deeply-rooted international 
business network of merchants, brokers and agents.33 Recognising the vitality of the 
systematic diffusion of information for commercial advancement and prosperity, the 
Venetians pioneered one of the world’s earliest postal systems, the Compagnia dei Corrieri.34 
Merchants, as seasoned travellers and correspondents, turned into skilled reporters. Their 
letters home produced a kind of pre-modern ‘data bank’.35 So important was their reportage 
                                                          
26 Frederic C. Lane, Venice, a Maritime Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1973). 
27 On the economy of sixteenth-century Venice, see Gino Luzzatto, Storia Economica di Venezia dall’XI al XVI 
Secolo (Venice: Centro Internazionale delle Arti e del Costume 1961); Lane, Venice; Paola Lanaro (ed.), At the 
Centre of the Old World: Trade and Manufacturing in Venice and on the Venetian Mainland (1400-1800) 
(Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies 2006).  
28 On the development of diplomacy in medieval and early modern Italy, see Lazzarini, ‘Renaissance 
Diplomacy’; for smaller Italian states see, Frigo, “‘Small States’ and Diplomacy: Mantua and Modena”, in idem 
(ed.), Politics and Diplomacy. 
29 De Vivo, Information and Communication, pp.70-71. 
30 On in news in Venice, see Pierre Sardella, Nouvelles et Spéculations à Venise au Début du XVIe Siècle (Paris: 
Colin 1947). On Venice as a centre of news, see Peter Burke, ‘Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information 
and Communication’, in J. Martin and D. Romano (eds.), Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of 
an Italian City-State, 1297–1797 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2002), pp.389-419; Mario Infelise, 
‘Professione Reportista: Copisti e Gazzettieri nella Venezia del Seicento’, in S. Gasparri, G. Levi, and P. Moro 
(eds.), Venezia: Itinerari per la Storia della Città (Bologna: Il Mulino 1997), pp.193-219. 
31 See Sardella, Nouvelles,  pp.19-43; Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know 
About Itself (New Haven: Yale University Press 2014). 
32 Mackenney, ‘Letters’, p.143. 
33 Pettegree, The Invention of News, pp.51-54. 
34 On the history of the postal system, see Bruno Caizzi, Dalla Posta dei Rei alla Posta dei Tutti (Milan, Franco 
Angeli 1993). 
35 Burke, ‘Early Modern Venice’, p.391. On merchants and the circulation of information, see Giorgio Doria, 
‘Conoscenza del Mercato e Sistema Informativo: Il know-how dei Mercanti Finanzieri Genovesi nei Secoli XVI 
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that in a letter to Charles the V, the Imperial ambassador in Venice reiterated that no news on 
the Turks had arrived from Venetian merchants in Constantinople,36 the city that housed an 
established colony of Venetian traders with a permanent formal representative, the bailo. The 
systematic correspondence between the Venetian authorities and the bailo was overflowing 
with information of political and economic weight.37 Incessantly reporting on the crucial 
Ottoman-Venetian relations,38 this communication never went unnoticed or unsuspected by 
the Turks, and rightly so. In 1491 for instance, the bailo was expelled from Constantinople, 
accused of spying.39 Indeed, he was. 
The fast-growing significance of information on the politics and economy of the Venetian 
empire rendered intelligence of any nature a determining factor in the city’s commercial and 
territorial pre-eminence. As a result, from 1563 the Venetian Republic started to officially 
inform its citizens on issues that were of particular interest to merchants, Venice’s lifeblood. 
These centred primarily on the on-going rivalry with the Ottomans. This kind of 
dissemination of information took the form of the world’s first newspaper, the gazeta de la 
novità. This namesake of the subsequent eponymous journalistic term was a small monthly 
news publication named after the gazeta, the small copper coin disbursed to purchase it. It 
was literally a ‘halfpennyworth of news’ that could be purchased from the Rialto market.40 
The Rialto market was the economic and commercial hub of Venice. Somewhat like an 
early modern Wall Street, it was the financial centre of the early modern world, a vast 
emporium of commodities, money and news. There, the impact of harvests, wars, epidemics 
and shipwrecks affected the price of victuals which, in turn, determined the price of insurance 
premiums, public debt investment and foreign currency.41 The news of the Portuguese’s new 
spice route to India through the Cape of Good Hope in 1501, for instance, sky-rocketed the 
price of pepper in Venice within four days.42 Reports of the seizure of Venetian galleys by 
the Turkish corsair Kamali in the same year shot maritime insurance rates up from 1.5 to 10 
per cent.43 So, for Venetians of all ranks who were either producing or trading commodities, 
news meant profit or loss. Actually, Venetians could not see a clear-cut distinction between 
politics and commerce, as political affairs could affect one’s business and livelihood, and 
commercial pursuits could have diplomatic implications.44 It is not a coincidence therefore, 
that their commercial and diplomatic correspondence travelled in the same saddle-bags until, 
in 1627, the Venetian corrieri formally petitioned for two separate sacks.45  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
e XVII’, in A. De Maddalena and H. Kellenbenz, (eds.), La Republica Internazionale del Denaro tra XV e XVII 
secolo (Bologna: Il Mulino 1986), pp.57-115.  
36 Archivio General de Simancas, legajo 1308, c.186 (5 May 1531). Full text in Emilio Sola, “Rodrigo Niño, 
embajador imperial en Venecia, a la caza de avisos”, Archivio de la Frontera, 
http://www.archivodelafrontera.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/A-MED08-rodrigo.pdf  (accessed 12 January 
2015). 
37 See, for instance, ASV, Inquisitori di Stato (hereafter IS), b. 148 and b. 433 for letters directed to the bailo; 
and Ibid., b. 416-428 for letters sent by the bailo. See also the archival series Secreta, Archivio Proprio 
Costantinopoli; Senato, Deliberazioni Costantinopoli, and Dispacci Ambasciatori, Costantinopoli; and Capi del 
Consiglio dei Dieci (hereafter CCX), Lettere di Ambascadori, Costantinopoli. 
38 On Venetians gathering information on the Ottomans, see Hans J. Kissling, ‘Venezia come centro di 
informazione sui Turchi’, in H. G. Beck, M. I.  Manoussakas, and A. Pertusi, (eds.), Venezia Centro di 
Mediazione fra Oriente e Occidente (sec. XV-XVI): Aspetti e Problemi (Florence: L. S. Olschki 1977), vol. 1, 
pp.97-109. 
39 Ibid., p. 101 
40 Julia Cresswell (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), p.186. 
41 Sardella, Nouvelles. 
42 Ibid., p.32. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p.90. 
45 Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, Nuova Serie, b. 46, fascicolo ‘184’ (8 Jan. 1627). 
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The Systemisation of Diplomacy, Bureaucracy and Intelligence  
 
The evolution of international politics and business was deeply influenced by the 
advancement of news. The latter was a by-product of the Printing Revolution that ran parallel 
to the Military Revolution.46 A combination of the two led to the consolidation of theories of 
warfare, politics and diplomacy and their circulation in printed from. As a result, the 
technical ‘how to’ literature on efficient ruling, military and ambassadorial practice increased 
in volume and, gradually, significance.47 Treatises on effective diplomatic practice started to 
emerge everywhere in Europe and with them came an ‘increasing documentary 
consciousness.’48  
With diplomacy on the path of sophistication, rulers, diplomats and political thinkers 
steadily worked towards the systematic organisation of information management processes.49 
Bureaucracy was taking shape and form and Venice was behind the wheel of this process. To 
ensure the efficiency of its diplomatic service, already from 1402 the Venetian authorities had 
established the official archive of the Republic’s state secrets. This was formally named 
Cancelleria Secreta, the Secret Chancellery, and affectionately termed cor status nostri, the 
heart of our state.50 For security purposes, the Secreta was situated in the Ducal Palace, 
Venice’s political nucleus. Security was so stringent that even the Doge could not enter 
unaccompanied. Ambassadors’ dispatches and any other classified reports were stored therein 
and governmental scribes, sworn to unyielding secrecy, meticulously copied and archived 
them day in day out.51 It should not come as a surprise then, that only illiterate candidates 
stood a chance of appointment as the archive’s guards.52 And it is not accidental that, as part 
of these bureaucratic processes, the Venetian government invested on the systematic 
development of cryptography, cryptanalysis and steganography.53 
The earliest collection of dispatches in the Secreta dates from 1477. It took some time for 
the authorities to grasp the significance of preserving these documents. Once in the sixteenth 
century they did, however, they systematised this procedure.54 By the late sixteenth century, 
the gates of the Secreta were opened to officials who were tasked with penning the history of 
Venice. Although there was no formal equivalent of an Official Secrets Act, official 
historians were not allowed to consult documents of the last decade, as their relevance to 
current affairs rendered them classified.55 Unquestionably, any publication of material was 
subject to approval by the authorities56 and any unauthorised or uncensored publication was 
confiscated and destroyed.57 In consequence, the collection, management and dissemination 
of information assumed strategic significance for Venice. 
                                                          
46 See Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996). 
47 See, for instance, Betty Behrens, ‘Treatises on the Ambassador Written in Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth 
Centuries’, English Historical Review LI/CCIV (1936), pp.616-627. 
48 Lazzarini, ‘Renaissance Diplomacy’, p.433. 
49 For an overview, see Bonilla, ‘Secret Intelligences’. 
50 See De Vivo, Information and Communication, pp.48-49. 
51 ASV, CX, Parti Secrete, Reg. 19, c.59r./verso (hereafter v.) (5 Apr. 1639). 
52 Baschet, Les Archives de Venise, pp.175-176. 
53 See, for instance, ASV, CX, Parti Secrete, Filza (hereafter f.) 15, (23 Nov.; 30 Dec. 1571). Ibid., Reg. 19, 
cc.18r./v. (14 July 1636). 
54 Burke, ‘Early Modern Venice’, p.393. 
55 ASV, CX, Parti Secrete, Reg. 11, c.130 (17 May 1577). 
56 The review committee were the Riformatori dello Studio di Padova. See ASV, CX, Parti Comuni, f. 36, 
c.154r. (7 Feb. 1544 more veneto – hereafter m.v. Nb. The Venetian calendar started on March 1st. All dates in 
this article follow this pattern). 
57 ASV, CCX, Lettere Secrete, f. 8 (28 Feb. 1572 m.v.) 
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This significance was not solely influential in the political landscape, where most 
intelligence scholars have cast their focus.58 This is because in Venice intelligence did not 
only serve purposes of political nature. Economic espionage that pertained to commerce and 
industry was as important for a capitalistic metropolis like Venice as its military equivalent.59 
This type of espionage was not new to the early modern world. The fascination with secrets 
of alchemy, science and nature harks back in medieval times and history is filled with 
instances of unauthorised seizures of technical secrets for competitive advantage.60 The 
Chinese were the first victims of this form of competitive intelligence. Their secrets of silk 
and porcelain production were stolen by the Byzantines in the sixth century and the Jesuits in 
the eighteenth century, respectively.61 The history of Venetian industry and trade abounds 
with cases of craftsmen and merchant spies sent abroad in order to extract information for 
their business affairs and the Venetian commercial community as a whole. Such state-
initiated clandestine missions involved reporting on new techniques for textile, cannon, 
mirror and porcelain production, with the intention of stealing a march on competitors.62  
Economic and industrial counter-intelligence was even more formalised in Venice. The 
prospect of the flight of artisans and, in consequence, the diffusion of trade secrets was an 
issue that haunted the Venetian authorities for centuries. As a result, in the name of Venetian 
monopoly, laws were created that forbade specialist craftsmen of strategic Venetian 
industries like ship, glass and silk production to emigrate. Disobedience was subject to civil 
and criminal sanctions, including death.63 Such state regulations were mandated by the 
Venetian guilds, which undergirded the export of Venetian products and restricted the 
diffusion of technical knowledge.64 The guild of the glassmakers, for instance, guarded 
specialist secrets with incredible zeal.65 As early as 1271, any glassmaker who set up 
workshop outside the city was liable to a fine. By 1295 those who dared defy this regulation 
risked expulsion from the guild.66 Similarly for the silk-weavers, by the 1370s their 
emigration was forbidden by law under the threat of one year’s imprisonment and a fine.67 
This type of counter-intelligence was part of Venetian diplomats and spies’ professional 
repertoire. In 1572 the bailo wrote of the presence in the Ottoman Arsenal of the renegade 
shipbuilder Nicolò Frassidono who produced replicas of the renowned quinqueremis 
designed by the Venetian humanist and naval architect Vettor Fausto.68 It seems that the 
Ottomans wished to boost their Navy with Venetian-like vessels, in an effort to forestall 
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another disaster like their ignominious defeat at Lepanto the year before.69 Writing from 
Genoa a century later, the governmental agent Antonio Bortoluzzi reported the relocation of 
five Muranese glassmakers in the city that was the perennial thorn in Venice’s side. They 
headed thither, he stated, to ‘plant a new Murano’. In a bid to higher compensation, 
Bortoluzzi volunteered to personally repatriate and reinstate them to the service of the 
Republic.70 Evidently, already from the pre-modern era piracy had multiple meanings and 
manifestations. It is not a coincidence therefore, that Venice was the first European state that, 
as early as 1474, granted patents that permitted not only monopolistic exploitation for a 
period of time, but licences of service.71 
It becomes apparent that intelligence in early modern Venice was not simply the collection 
of information of political or military nature; it encompassed a wide spectrum of spheres, 
including those of economy and society. In fact, early modern Venetian intelligence emerged 
in the continuum between politics, economy and society and became the key determinant of 
the Republic’s commercial and, by extension, political supremacy.72 It is due to this 
continuum that the notion of intelligence, as we perceive it today, becomes blurred. A 
discussion of the variety of professional and amateur intelligencers that the Republic 
employed for its clandestine missions will help clear the murky landscape of pre-modern 
intelligence. 
  
Channels and Agents of Information in Early Modern Venice 
 
It has already become evident that for a quintessential commercial metropolis like Venice, 
intelligence was a major player in the city’s commercial and territorial supremacy. It has also 
been contended that in Venice there were three main channels of information and intelligence 
gathering and reportage: the political, the commercial and the personal. So, who were the 
spies and informants of the Republic that made part of these channels? They were actually 
recruited from a wide spectrum of social ranks depending on their distinctive set of skills and 
the variety of tasks they were asked to perform. 
The gradual systemisation of covert communication throughout Europe in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries can be attributed to the key role embassies played on the organised 
flow of information through their networks. Ambassadors were instrumental in this process.73 
Venetian ambassadors were not an exception. These were noblemen who were officially sent 
on diplomatic missions in foreign courts and were responsible for representation, negotiation 
and information.74 In a way, they professionalised the act of information gathering through 
their systematic collection and dispatch of detailed intelligence reports. To ensure secrecy, 
these were more often than not drafted in cipher. Venetian ambassadors acted as quasi-
official spies for the Republic, tasked with spying on the plans and the secrets of other 
princes.75  
                                                          
69 ASV, Secreta, Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli, f. 6 (15 Sep. 1572). 
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The Venetian political channel of information was not solely restricted to formal 
ambassadors, as was the case for other Italian states.76 Venice’s sophisticated diplomatic 
network extended to officially appointed representatives in Venetian cities in the Terraferma 
(the Venetian mainland) – the rettori; in Venetian dominated regions of the Stato da Mar (the 
Venetian oversees possessions) – the Proveditori; and in other areas of the Mediterranean 
where there was notable Venetian merchant presence – the consoli. Intelligence gathering 
was part of those envoys’ duties and they all appointed and oversaw their individual 
informants in order to fulfil their responsibilities. The Venetian authorities did not 
micromanage this process. They received the information, channelled it back to all relevant 
authorities, commanded and expected execution, trusting that their delegates would see to the 
job.  In July 1574, for instance, the rectors of Verona received orders to arrest and question 
three Veronese men on the grounds of a severe accusation. A French alchemist resident in the 
city wrote directly to the French King, warning him that the three had prepared a lethal 
poison for him. Undeniably, a potential assassination of the most Christian of Kings by 
Venetian subjects could cause a major diplomatic incident. The rectors, therefore, were 
instructed to have the residences of the potential culprits searched for suspicious documents, 
chemicals and anything that could indicate criminal action. Within two days they responded 
to the authorities that there was no reason to suspect those ‘men of good nature’ but would 
not free them without direct orders from Venice. Eventually, the French alchemist’s letter 
was considered a hoax, the authorities requested no further action and the incident was 
buried.77 This is just one instance of the corporate-like distribution of duties within the 
Venetian intelligence apparatus that set it apart from other states’ intelligence operations. The 
latter primarily relied on the communication between the ruler and the ambassador.78 
Merchants and businessmen comprised the commercial channel of intelligence gathering 
and reportage. This is because secrecy and efficient intelligence had been widely regarded as 
key constituents of successful business affairs. Frederic Lane’s famous merchant of Venice, 
Andrea Barbarigo, already from the 1430s had created his own cipher for confidential 
communication with his business agent in the Levant.79 It should not come as a surprise then 
that Venetian merchants, as seasoned travellers and dealers in both merchandise and news, 
made perfect undercover agents for the Venetian authorities. In 1496, for instance, during the 
ongoing rivalry between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, the young merchant and future 
doge of Venice Andrea Gritti was a resident merchant in Constantinople. Aside from his 
commercial duties, he was charged with sending intelligence of political and military nature 
to his motherland. To prevent suspicion, Gritti coded his intelligence in commercial lingo and 
presented it as business communication instead. He once reported, for instance, that he was in 
prison for debt but he would be released in June, meaning that the Turkish fleet was planning 
to set sail in that month.80 Commercial coding proved quite a popular clandestine practice for 
Venetian spies. During the Fourth Ottoman-Venetian war, the Venetian authorities appointed 
the Jewish merchant Caim Saruch as their spy in the Sublime Porte. A skilled intelligencer, 
Saruch even produced – and had approved by the authorities – his own cipher, coding the 
Ottomans as ‘drugs’, their army as a ‘caravan’, and artillery as ‘mirrors’.81 Overall, even 
when not always on official covert missions, merchants were instructed to signal any 
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suspicious manoeuvre of the enemies’ ships, especially from various areas of the Middle East 
where they were stationed.82 
In a business-savvy state like Venice the secret services devised several tactics to utilise 
the personal intelligence gathering pursuits of all members of the Venetian society.83 Clergy 
and Jews, the former due to social respect, the latter due to lack of it, enjoyed a relative 
immunity that rendered them effective covert operatives. In February 1500, for instance, a 
strange mission was assigned to the Jewish doctor Leon Abravanel who lived in Naples. 
Aside from his medical practice, Abravanel was known as a skilled astrologer. In that 
capacity, he was sent to Constantinople to extract information from the Sultan’s astrologer.84 
Other respectable professionals like lawyers and notaries, with direct access to their clients’ 
private affairs, acted as frequent informants to the government. Depending on the value of the 
communication they traded, they did not hesitate to leak information to the Spanish and 
French ambassadors when the opportunity arose to pad their pockets.85 
More strikingly, commoners, in their various trades and professions, were also engaged in 
intelligence gathering and, at times, espionage. Apothecaries, due to their pricy merchandise 
and, as a result, distinguished clientele, had access to information that was potentially of 
interest to the authorities.86 Barber shops, where men of any rank mingled and chattered 
during their daily grooming routine, became hubs of political conversations and, as a result, 
the locals of many information dealers.87 Travellers, soldiers and refugees were charged with 
sharing news about war, national politics and international affairs.88 Residents in Venetian 
subject territories became local agents for the Republic on account of their linguistic abilities. 
Even banished criminals were frequently tasked with covert missions due to their audacious 
personalities.89 One striking example of a banished felon turned secret agent is that of 
Giovanni Antonio Barata. In February 1571, at the break of the war with the Turks, the 
Republic was desperate for reconnaissance in the Ottoman capital. In need of cash, Barata did 
not think twice. Furnished with an extensive job description, a ‘handmade’ cipher for 
producing ‘merchant-style’ letters, and instructions on using invisible ink, he was sent to 
Constantinople to spy on the enemy.90 Conscious of his hazardous mission, the Venetian 
authorities took his wife and young children under their wing while he was on duty. For this 
purpose, they relocated them to the Venetian city of Bergamo and provided them with a 
monthly stipend which turned into a permanent yearly pension for Barata’s widow when, 
nearly one year later, he was decapitated in Constantinople.91 
So, it is fair to say that in early modern Venice there was spying, rather than spies. This is 
not surprising since intelligence, as a professional service, had not yet been subjected to 
formal division of labour between professional activities.92 In this respect, it is difficult to 
construct a clear definition of a spy in that period. The Venetian author Tommaso Garzoni, 
however, anticipated this challenge. In a 1587 treatise, he defined spies as ‘the sort of people 
that, in secret, follow armies and enter cities, exploring the affairs of enemies, and reporting 
them back to their own people. And even if the profession is infamous and, if found, they are 
                                                          
82 Preto, I Servizi Segreti, pp.248-250. 
83 Kissling, ‘Venezia come centro’. 
84 ASV, CCX, Lettere di Ambasciatori, b. 18 (15 Feb. 1500). 
85 De Vivo, Information and Communication, p.78. 
86 Ibid., p.87. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., p.91. 
89 Preto, I Servizi Segreti, p.247. 
90 ASV, CCX, Lettere Secrete, f. 7 (17 Feb. 1570 m.v.); ASV, CX, Parti Secrete, Reg. 9, cc.126v.-127r. (26 Jan. 
1570 m.v.). 
91 Ibid., c.198r. (15 Dec.1571). 
92 Peter Burke, ‘Early Modern Venice’, p.393. 
12 
 
hung by the neck, these people are essential, as History and practice have shown.’93 His 
contemporary Bartolomeo Pelliciari from Modena described spies on similar terms in his 
treatise on the instrumentality of good intelligence in military affairs.94 
Already by the beginning of the seventeenth century the word ‘spy’ had assumed negative 
connotations for Venetians. It was most commonly used to indicate an enemy’s informant or 
the one that reported on the suspicious behaviour of fellow citizens.95 In this context a spy 
was called spia or spione. A 1613 anonymous denunciation for instance, accused a certain 
Fausto Verdelli of being a spione, speaking of Venice in a despicable manner and reporting 
on Venetian affairs to Savoy, Loraine, Flanders, and the Spanish ambassador.96 For linguistic 
distinction, one’s own spies were called confidenti,97 a term that replaced the Medieval Latin 
idiom explorator. 98 The remit of a confidente was by no means restricted to political or 
military espionage. As their innumerable surviving reports testify, they informed on any 
matter of state security.  
One did not have to be on the government’s permanent payroll to be a spy. Casually 
contracted informants were in high demand, as long as they were a persona fidata and 
prudente or a soggetto confidente (a trustworthy subject).99 At the start of the Third Ottoman-
Venetian war for instance, when communication between Venice and the Baylo or Venetian 
merchants in Constantinople had been broken, the authorities ordered for a persona fidel et 
prattica to be sent to the Sublime Porte for reconnaissance purposes.100 All these linguistic 
variations indicate the different manifestations of professional and amateur intelligence 
gathering and espionage in the early modern era. In this respect, the term ‘spy’ is as loosely 
defined as the spectrum of early modern intelligence.  
 
Venice’s State Intelligence Service 
 
As we have already seen, Venice’s state intelligence apparatus, operating on three distinct yet 
composite levels, the political, the commercial and the personal, had a corporate-like 
character that distinguished it from the espionage networks of other Italian and European 
states. There, the organisation, distribution and delegation of duties was orchestrated within 
the headquarters of the Ducal Palace by one of the most powerful executive committees, the 
Council of Ten. Established in 1310, the Council of Ten was the administrative body 
responsible for secret affairs, public order and state security. It was actually made up of 
seventeen men, including the ten ordinary members, six ducal councillors and the Doge at its 
head. It was initially tasked with protecting the government from overthrow or corruption. By 
the mid-fifteenth century its powers had extended so much, that it was administering 
Venice’s diplomatic and intelligence operations, military affairs, legal matters and law 
enforcement.101 This was not an easy job, yet, demonstrating an extraordinary political (and 
corporate) maturity, the Ten managed to oversee the internal and external security of the 
Venetian dominion through the meticulous organisation and management of their political, 
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commercial and private agents’ intelligence operations. It is this unique complexity, 
efficiency and corporate-like organisation of Venice’s intelligence apparatus that renders it 
eligible for the title of the world’s earliest centrally organised state intelligence service. 
To safeguard the secrecy of state affairs, in 1539 the Council of Ten formed the body of 
the Inquisitors of the State.102 Initially entitled ‘Inquisitors against the Disclosures of Secrets’, 
the Inquisitors of the State were a special magistracy made up of three men. Their activity 
encompassed all aspects of state security, including conspiracies, betrayals, public order and 
espionage. Most importantly, they were tasked with counter-intelligence and the supervision 
and protection of state secrets. The State Inquisitors played the role of a modern day ‘Big 
Brother’; nothing and nobody escaped the ears and eyes of their spies.103 Their confidenti 
were ubiquitous and, as we have seen, multifaceted. They reported on anything and anyone 
that could pose threats: foreign ambassadors, immigrants, gamblers, potential impostors and 
trouble makers, and foreign armies.104 In fact, in a city that was an un-walled island with no 
court to confine secrecy, gossip thrived and the ingenuous State Inquisitors found a way to 
avail of this weakness for their recruitment purposes.  
The Venetians were by nature seasoned businessman and skilled tattlers. With open minds 
and loose tongues, they had mastered the arts of business and gossip alike. This is the aspect 
to which the Venetian government turned in order to safeguard the cooperation of its subjects 
in the collection, management and dissemination of information. It did so through the 
medium of the supplica. The supplica was an official request for a favour: a job, citizenship, 
a patent and a salary increase, amongst others. In exchange, Venetians offered their services 
to the Republic by means of a raccordo, that is, a suggestion for an invention or a revelation 
of a secret that could benefit the state. The raccordi were made directly to the Ten, who were 
always eager to purchase weighty information. Some of the suggestions in the raccordi were 
so ingenuous, that in 1579 the state decided to catalogue and archive them.105 In essence, 
Venetians could propose an invention or the revelation of significant information in exchange 
for a favour. As a result, information gathering and reportage assumed a transactional 
character between the government and the governed. 
One characteristic example of this transactional system can be offered by the infamous 
Venetian womaniser Giacomo Casanova. In 1763, banished from his beloved Venice and 
longing to return, Casanova begun to serve the Inquisitors on a voluntary basis. Writing from 
London, he offered the Venetian ambassador the trial of a product that dyed cotton fabric red, 
an innovation at the time. This innovation, according to Casanova, would boost the 
production of Venetian cotton cloth and lead French and English merchants to the Venetian 
market. His attempt was unsuccessful, as were numerous others that followed. When nearly a 
decade later, however, he voluntarily exposed and halted the illegal operation of an Armenian 
printing house in Trieste that was competing with its Venetian counterpart, the Inquisitors 
granted him the longed-for revocation of his banishment.106 Notably, Casanova’s revelations 
had commercial, rather than political significance, demonstrating, once again, the correlation 
between politics and commerce for the Venetian Republic. Overall, for the city that rose from 
a small community of fishermen to a maritime empire built on commodities, intelligence took 
the form of a commercial transaction between the government and the governed, a trade as 
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thriving, as that of spice, silk and news. It seems that Venice did not just systematise 
intelligence, it commodified it. 
 
The Sanctity and Illusion of Secrecy 
 
Unlike most early modern European states, Venice was a water-locked metropolis, confined 
and protected by a lagoon. It was also one of the largest cities in Europe, with a population of 
around 150,000 inhabitants by the mid-sixteenth century.107 With no physical confines to 
safeguard sensitive information and a population that had one of the highest literacy rates in 
Europe, information was bound to slip in a maze of directions within and beyond the city’s 
canals and circuitous streets. The lack of established degrees of exclusion, like a court, meant 
that information could escape the Ducal Palace and snake through the echoing calli with the 
same remarkable speed that it could reach it. In fact, leakage of sensitive information had 
many outlets. At any time that the Senate convened, 250 senators and nearly 200 nobles of 
the Great Council had access to these affairs. Aside from extended family networks, most of 
these men had an entourage of servants and gondoliers accompanying them to the Palace on a 
daily basis. Thirsty for gossip and its rewards, their eyes and ears were constantly wide 
open.108 Information, therefore, could be overheard or directly communicated by innumerable 
people. The illegitimate offspring of these noblemen were particularly prone to disclosures, 
provided they spawned privileges that made up for their political marginalisation in Venice 
due to their impurity.109  
Venetian ambassadors constituted another vehicle through which confidential information 
circulated within and beyond the watery confines of the city. Before their departure for their 
diplomatic mission, they were granted access to the official archive of state secrets, the 
Secreta. There, they read their predecessors’ dispatches and any other relevant records that 
would assist them in their diplomatic service. They were also allowed to make copies that 
invariably leaked in various directions. Upon completion of their diplomatic missions and 
repatriation, ambassadors had to deliver their relazione, their end-of-mission-report, and 
deposit it in the Secreta.110 The relazioni contained classified information on enemies and 
allies and were highly sought after by foreign ambassadors and local patricians alike.111 In a 
service like the Secreta, that employed 80-100 secretaries, disclosures were inevitable and, 
more often than not, profitable. Ultimately, the authors of the relazioni were willing to leak 
them primarily for publicity purposes.112 The Venetian government’s concerns with secrecy 
were, therefore, not dissimilar to seminal disclosure issues faced by contemporary 
governments. 
Another avenue for the breach of political secrecy was the institution of the broglio, the 
patricians’ public networking gathering.113 The broglio took place daily in a square just 
outside the gates of the Ducal Palace. There, patricians exchanged news, arranged strategic 
alliances, and negotiated political deals. Unlike other such gatherings in courtly settings, the 
broglio was a public, informal and rather unstructured institution.114 As a result, it was the 
                                                          
107 Andrea Zannini, ‘Un censimento del primo seicento e la crisi demografica ed economica di Venezia’, Studi 
Veneziani 26 (1993), pp.87-116. 
108 Jonathan Walker, Filippo de Vivo, and James Shaw, ‘A Dialogue on Spying in 17th Century Venice’, 
Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 10/33 (2006), pp. 323-344, (p.325). 
109 De Vivo, Information and communication, p.46. 
110 On the relazioni, see Donald E. Queller, ‘The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni’, in J.R. Hale, 
Renaissance Venice (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield 1973), pp.174-196. 
111 De Vivo, Information and Communication, p.62. 
112 Ibid., p.51. 
113 On the broglio, see Finlay, Politics, pp.27-28. 
114 Walker et al., p.324.  
15 
 
target of close surveillance, especially because foreign ambassadors took the opportunity to 
mingle with nobles in their thirst for valuable intelligence.115 Incidentally, Venetians serving 
in high-ranking offices like the Senate, the Collegio, and the Secret Councils were forbidden 
by law to speak to foreign ambassadors in private. Any breach of this law would incur a 
penalty of 1000 ducats.116 In 1612, the English ambassador in Venice reported back to 
England that foreign ambassadors in the city were restricted by the same impositions.117 To 
minimise contact with foreign emissaries and their entourage and to ascertain that all 
diplomatic communication took place only through formally approved channels, embassies in 
Venice were located in the periphery of the city, away from the centre.118  Secrecy, therefore, 
was both an obsession and an illusion in the floating city.  
 
Secrecy and the Myth of Venice 
 
So, what was the obsession of Venetian authorities with secrecy? The answer can be traced in 
the infamous Myth of Venice. According to the sixteenth-century eulogist Francesco 
Sansovino, Venice was a city unique in its grandeur, power and politics.119 The pillar of this 
distinctiveness was the Myth of Venice, the view that public laws and private acts were 
placed at the service of the common good. At least that was the belief that the government 
strove to implant in Venetians’ minds. As a result, Venetians enjoyed an allegedly strong 
sense of community and relative social harmony that brought them together in unison and 
concord.120 Although the debate over the reality of the Myth of Venice is beyond the scope of 
this article, in effect, it was a Venetian mask portraying public good and unity triumphing 
over private interests and disagreements. Appearances were vital in Venice. Indeed, both 
internally and externally, St. Mark’s protégée projected an image of a Republic where 
absence of civil discord went hand in hand with a sense of social serenity so deep that the city 
was nominated La Serenissima, the most serene of cities. 
The practical manifestation of this self-perceived Myth of Venice took form in the 
encouragement of every Venetian citizen and subject to contribute to public good and 
security by gathering and divulging information pertaining to the Republic’s political, 
economic and social stability. As a result, written denunciations were left in churches, on the 
stairs of public buildings and at the doorsteps of state officials, until the infamous Bocche di 
Leone appeared in late sixteenth century.121 These were pre-modern post-boxes for 
anonymous denunciations. Literally sculpted as a lion’s mouth, they served as the eyes and 
ears of the city. In their orifice, citizens could anonymously denounce fellow citizens on 
crucial issues of public order and security.122 In compensation for their cooperation, 
Venetians received state protection and a dose of pride in their civic loyalty. By encouraging 
people of all ranks, including ordinary commoners who were excluded from political 
participation, to partake so indirectly in political statecraft, the Venetian authorities managed 
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to control public behaviour, place the public on their side and ensure the smooth functioning 
of the state.123 
As the smooth functioning of the state was top priority, public protection and control had 
to be achieved by any means. Within this context, secrecy became an emblem of harmony 
and civil concord. Any sign of conflict or debate was deemed dangerous and had to be 
concealed at any cost. This was most certainly the case for the governmental assemblies, 
where members were forbidden by law to reveal any possible debates that took place 
therein.124 When secrecy failed, the consequences could be catastrophic. In 1542, for 
instance, a great diplomatic scandal broke when Venetian officials leaked state secrets to the 
French ambassador. When a governmental delegation demanded that the ambassador hand 
over the culprits, his men violently assaulted them. News travelled faster than the wind within 
the city’s streets and the incident became a cause célèbre within hours. The public took to the 
streets shouting and menacingly marching towards the French embassy. As a result, the 
authorities were forced to encircle the area with armed guards for two days. Letters were sent 
to the Venetian envoys in France and Constantinople requesting that the turncoats be found 
and punished. The Venetian ambassador in France was asked to petition the King for a new 
ambassador, one that was ‘more dexterous in negotiation’. Importantly, the government took 
these prompt and drastic steps to ‘appease the mayhem of the public’.125 Doing so and 
showing that Venetians were an indispensable part of a state apparatus that operated for their 
welfare and benefit was the authorities’ primary concern. 
It seems plausible to hypothesise, therefore, that through the perceived triumph of the 
common good over personal interests, Venetian authorities managed to instil in Venetian 
subjects a certain degree of institutional loyalty, contrary to scholarly claims that institutional 
loyalty had not yet developed in the early modern period.126 Jacob Burckhardt appositely 
remarked that ‘no State, indeed, has ever exercised a greater moral influence over its subjects, 
whether abroad or at home’.127 Could this be a proto-modern form of patriotism?  
 
Conclusion 
 
By the sixteenth century most Western European states had started to weave webs of 
diplomatic representations across and beyond the continent.128 Venice was at the forefront of 
this process, having organised an efficient network of formal and informal covert operatives 
abroad and at home. These were charged with reporting on enemies, supporting military 
action, safeguarding commercial activity, and ensuring the internal stability of the state.129 
While for most Italian states such systematic communication was reserved for the ruler and 
his ambassadors, and for other European monarchies such processes were initiatives of 
individuals for personal advancement, Venice was emblematic in its centrally organised state 
intelligence service. In an exemplar of systematic complexity, efficiency and corporate-like 
organisation, the Council of Ten and State Inquisitors oversaw the clandestine activities of a 
great variety of informants and spies. In fact, the Ten and the Inquisitors offer one of the first 
instances of a formal state intelligence service with a – premature, to be sure – sophisticated 
organisation somewhat analogous to that of modern-day intelligence agencies. The notion, 
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therefore, that centrally organised intelligence services only emerged in the modern era does 
no longer stand on firm ground. 
Scholars have long dwelled on the study of intelligence in the era after The Great War, 
with a particular focus on the nature and impact of intelligence services and their operations 
on domestic and foreign affairs. Yet, the diffusion of information as a human behaviour is a 
historical phenomenon that spans from the messengers of ancient Athens to the patrons of the 
Enlightenment coffeehouse and beyond. It also serves purposes beyond politics and 
diplomacy, primarily of economic security, if not dominance. Contemporary hacking and 
whistleblowing practices, a topical issue for intelligence practitioners and scholars nowadays, 
are built on similar incentives and premises; people’s need for knowledge, security and 
prominence. The exploration of the precursors of the highly organised modern-day state 
intelligence institutions, so alien to our contemporary world yet so astonishingly familiar, can 
yield great lessons about the need for and significance of intelligence. The challenge for the 
contemporary scholar is to recognise the familiar in the alien and the alien in the familiar. 
And it is only by doing so that we will be able to understand the fascinating ways in which 
intelligence developed through the centuries and the manifold purposes it served. 
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